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COMMENTS 
SECULAR DISSENT: PROTECTING NON-




It is common practice for states to contract with third party 
organizations to run their parole rehabilitation programs. A majority of 
these organizations emphasize religious themes as a means of recovery 
from alcohol and substance abuse problems. However, for parolees who 
reject a belief in God, there are rarely any secular alternatives available. 
Those whom object are often given the choice between forced participation 
in religious activities or revocation of their parole. For years, courts have 
held that such practices violate parolees’ First Amendment rights. 
Nonetheless, most states have failed to implement policies to prevent such 
violations from reoccurring. Due to the country’s increasingly secular 
population, it is becoming more important that states do so. Existing laws, 
such as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, should be 
used to guide new reforms to protect parolees whom object to religious 
rehabilitation programs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2007, Barry Hazle completed a one-year prison sentence for 
methamphetamine possession and was released on parole.1 As a condition 
of parole, he was required to complete a residential drug rehabilitation 
program approved by the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDOC).2 The only program available in his region used a 
version of the so-called “12-Step Program” pioneered by Alcoholics 
Anonymous (AA).3 This rehabilitation model required participants to make 
various religious affirmations, including a belief in God or higher power.4 
As an atheist, Hazle objected to participating in such a program and 
requested that he be placed in one with a more secular outlook. But since 
the CDOC had not approved other rehabilitation programs in his area, his 
parole officer gave him no choice but to participate in the religious one or 
return to prison.5 Upon learning of Hazle’s reservations, program staff told 
him: “Anything can be your higher power. Fake it till you make it.”6 When 
Hazle refused to comply, he was thrown out of the program, declared in 
violation of parole, and returned to prison, where he remained for an 
additional 100 days.7 After filing suit for First Amendment rights violations 
and six years of ensuing litigation, Hazle’s claim was finally vindicated.8  
 
1  Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). 
2  Id. 
3  Id.  
4  Kimberly Winston, Barry A. Hazle Jr., Atheist, Should Be Compensated By State For 
Religious Rehab, Says Court, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/08/26/barry-a-hazle-atheist-religious-rehab-california_n_3818833.html. 
5  Id. 
6  Bob Egelko, Atheist Inmate Settles for $1.95 Million Over 12-Step Drug Rehab, 
SFGATE, Oct. 15, 2014, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Atheist-inmate-settles-for-1-95-
million-over-5822767.php (internal quotation marks omitted).  
7  See Scott Mobley, Judge: Atheist’s rights violated, REDDING RECORD SEARCHLIGHT, 
Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.redding.com/news/judge-atheists-rights-violated. Program staff 
described Hazle as resisting “in a congenial way.” Id. 
8  See Ed Mazza, Barry A. Hazle Jr., Atheist, Wins Nearly $2 Million In Settlement Over 
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After the Ninth Circuit overturned a jury verdict for failure to award 
damages, Hazle settled with the CDOC and the company that managed the 
religious rehabilitation program for nearly two million dollars.9 
Incidents of this sort are increasingly common for two reasons.10  First, 
because atheists, agnostics, and other individuals with heterodox beliefs 
(hereinafter “heterodox prisoners” or “heterodox parolees”) have come to 
occupy a larger share of America’s religious landscape, it is expected that 
First Amendment issues like those that Hazle faced will continue to 
increase.11 Although heterodox individuals are generally underrepresented 
in prison populations,12 higher societal representation will naturally lead to 
a higher raw number of interactions with the criminal justice system and, 
specifically, the parole system.  Second, and more importantly, the majority 
of modern parole programs are not organized or implemented by state 
departments of corrections (DOC) or the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)13 
but rather by third-party institutions, a large number of which incorporate 
religious teachings and require participating parolees to submit to a higher 
power.14  This is because legislatures have sought to offset the financial 
 
Faith-Based Rehab Program, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 15, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/10/15/barry-a-hazle-jr-atheist-settlement_n_5987630.html. 
9  Denny Walsh, Shasta atheist wins $2 million settlement over drug program, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 14, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article2768782.
html. The jury found for Hazle on the merits but only awarded nominal damages. Id. CDOC 
and the rehabilitation company each paid roughly half of the total settlement figure. Id. 
10  See infra notes 31, 39–42  and accompanying discussion for similar incidents.  
11  See U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/#social-and-
political-values (finding that the religiously unaffiliated or “nones” are becoming 
increasingly secular); see also “Nones” on the Rise, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (finding that the percentage of 
Americans identifying as either atheist or agnostic increased from 3.7%to 5.7% from 2007 to 
2012 while the overall share of religiously unaffiliated grew from 15.3%to 19.6% in the 
same period). 
12  Mona Chalabi, Are Prisoners Less Likely To Be Atheists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Mar. 
12, 2015, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-prisoners-less-likely-to-be-atheists/ (finding 
that atheists and agnostics make up only 0.7% of the federal prison population while 
accounting for about 5.7% of the overall population). 
13  See generally Emily M. Gallas, Endorsing Religion: Drug Courts and the 12-Step 
Recovery Support Program, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1063 (2004). 
14  The most prevalent religious rehabilitation model is known as the 12-Step Program. 
First propagated in the 1930s by American evangelical Bill Wilson, it calls for participants to 
make twelve successive commitments in order to achieve sobriety. Of the twelve, seven 
involve God, religion, or prayer. Significantly, God is referred to in the singular and 
distinguished from the “powerless” alcoholic. Alcoholics Anonymous is the largest 
substance-abuse rehabilitation organization in the United States. See generally ALCOHOLICS 
ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: THE STORY OF HOW MANY 
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burden associated with containing more prisoners by outsourcing the 
administration of parole to such contracting third-party institutions.15 Often, 
given the lack of alternative institutions, access to parole is essentially 
contingent on the profession or practice of religious faith. This situation has 
led to a non-trivial number of individuals—who, like Mr. Hazle, reject 
some or all religious teachings—to have been found in violation of their 
parole for attempting to protect their First Amendment rights (hereinafter 
“heterodox prisoners” or “heterodox parolees”). 
Instances of the problem Hazle experienced (hereinafter the 
“heterodox parolee problem”), however, have not occurred everywhere. 
Instead, they have occurred more frequently in those states and jurisdictions 
without any statutory, administrative, or regulatory protections allowing 
parolees to express philosophical dissent without adverse consequences as 
compared to those states that have implemented such protections.16 This 
Comment argues that these protections are becoming increasingly necessary 
not only to protect heterodox parolees, but also to protect public budgets, 
which are strained when parolees initiate costly litigation to vindicate their 
civil rights. Though a handful of commentators suggest simply banning 
religious non-profits from administering parole programs to solve the 
heterodox parolee program,17 this Comment rejects such an approach as it 
would achieve the first goal (protecting heterodox parolees) at the expense 
of the second (protecting public budgets). Rather, this Comment argues that 
an appropriate solution to the heterodox parolee problem must balance the 
rights of parolees, on the one hand, with the monetary and administrative 
interests of government apparatuses on the other. 
Part I of this Comment provides background on several issues 
underlying the heterodox parolee problem. First, it surveys the vigorous 
scholarly debate on the constitutionality of outsourcing parole programs to 
religiously and ideologically affiliated non-profits. This part demonstrates a 
firm scholarly and judicial consensus finding that the practice is 
unconstitutional where participation in such programs is compulsory. 
Second, Part I examines the relevant cases, paying particular attention to 
common features in judicial reasoning and decision-making. This part finds 
 
THOUSANDS OF MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM ALCOHOLISM (4th ed. 2002). See 
also CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? (2d ed. 1998). Narcotics 
Anonymous, the largest drug-abuse recovery program in the United States, also uses the 12-
Step Program. 
15  See generally Gallas, supra note 13. 
16  See infra Part II for discussion of specific protections.  
17  See, e.g., Susan Henderson-Utis, Comment, What Would the Founding Fathers Do? 
The Rise of Religious Programs in the United States Prison System, 52 HOW. L. J. 459 
(2009). 
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that judges have vindicated parolees’ constitutional claims with remarkable 
consistency, despite the fact that judges have uniformly declined to address 
the constitutionality of using religious non-profits to administer parole 
programs generally. 
Part II examines the existing laws, rules, and regulations that govern 
parole programs. By and large, this Comment finds that legislators, 
bureaucrats, and other official decision makers fail to address the lack of 
parole protections for heterodox parolees. The handful of protections that 
do exist constitute a step in the right direction. But most are ambiguous or 
circuitous, and therefore insufficient for a society that is becoming less 
Christian and more likely to assert beliefs that conflict with the dominant 
philosophy of non-profit parole programs. 
Part III focuses on the construction of new legal protections for 
heterodox parolees within the context of the country’s existing 
rehabilitation infrastructure. After analyzing the costs and benefits to the 
government agencies responsible for corrections and parole, this Comment 
argues that the best solution to the heterodox parolee problem would not 
involve—as other commentators have suggested—an outright ban on 
religious parole programs. Instead, the solution would involve 
implementing rules and regulations barring penalties for sincere objections 
to religious parole programs. This Comment argues that existing laws (the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act18 and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act19), regulations (Charitable Choice20), and 
administrative rules (CDOC Memorandum Directive No. 08-0621) provide 
strong guidance to this end. Existing laws protect prisoners’ sincerely held 
religious beliefs and provide a framework enabling them to vindicate their 
rights in court. Given the continuity of focus and wealth of case law, 
implementing a modified version of the rights established by laws, 
regulations, and administrative rules provides the best guide for legislative 
action. 
 
18  See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000cc-1 to -5 (2000). 
19  See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1993). 
20  See Charitable Choice Regulations Applicable to States Receiving Substance Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Block Grants and/or Projects for Assistance in Transition from 
Homelessness Grants, 42 C.F.R. § 54 (2016). 
21  See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MEMORANDUM DIRECTIVE NO. 08-06: PAROLEE 
PARTICIPATION IN FAITH-BASED DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS (2008).  
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED PAROLE 
PROGRAMS: SCHOLARSHIP AND CASE LAW 
Although this Comment emphasizes practical concerns over theoretical 
ones, the scholarly debate over the constitutionality of using religious non-
profits to administer parole programs, and how that debate accords with 
case law, provides a useful context for thinking about solutions. To the 
extent that commentators have addressed the topic, there is a clear 
consensus that religious rehabilitation programs violate the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause only when they are effectively 
compulsory because no alternatives are available.22 A zealous minority, 
however, has argued that the use of religious non-profits to administer 
parole programs is unconstitutional even if alternatives are available.23 
To the chagrin of commentators arguing for the strict 
unconstitutionality of religious parole programs, no judge has decided the 
question. However, when the narrower issue of an individual’s 
constitutional rights has arisen, courts have consistently vindicated the 
plaintiff’s position.24 As discussed above, Mr. Hazle filed suit under 
42 U.S.C § 1983 claiming that his First Amendment rights had been 
violated when he was returned to jail for 100 additional days for failing to 
adequately participate in an in-patient drug rehabilitation program 
administered by a religious non-profit as required for parole.25 However, 
Hazle only appealed on the issue of damages because he had already won 
summary judgment on the substance of his claim.26 The district court judge 
awarded summary judgment on the substance of Hazle’s claim because 
there was already a strong consensus that the First Amendment barred state 
actors from compelling prisoners and parolees to attend religious 
programs.27 This part discusses how this consensus has evolved. 
Supreme Court cases on the Establishment Clause are generally 
 
22  See, e.g., Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God 
by the State, 47 DUKE L. J. 785 (1997); Rachel F. Calabro, Correction through Coercion: Do 
State Mandated Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment 
Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 565 (2004); Christopher M. Meissner, Prayer or Prison: The 
Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Faith-Based Substance Abuse Treatment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 671 (2006); Michael G. Honeymar, Note, Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of 
Drunk Driving Probation: When Does It Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 437 (1997); Gallas, supra note 13. 
23  See, e.g., Henderson-Utis, supra note 17. 
24  See infra notes 29–40 and accompanying discussion.  
25  See Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 987–90 (9th Cir. 2013). 
26  See id. 
27  See id. 
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organized into two categories.28 The first involves the government 
attempting to “coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise.”29 Such cases arise when “the state is imposing religion on an 
unwilling subject.”30 The Supreme Court has unequivocally held this type 
of behavior unconstitutional.31 The second category of cases includes those 
involving government actors and institutions behaving in a way that 
benefits religions.32 At least until recently, the Lemon test has been the 
preferred means of adjudicating these cases.33 The Lemon test evolved from 
a challenge to the constitutionality of state laws providing aid to private 
parochial schools. It requires, that to be constitutional, a law must (1) “have 
a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion,” 
and (3) “not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”34 Although some scholars have suggested that the Supreme 
Court may be moving away from this test, it is still followed.35 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, state 
and lower federal courts unanimously classify cases involving religious 
themed rehabilitation in the “coercion” category.36  The Seventh Circuit—
the first appellate court to adjudicate the issue—created the now dominant 
test for evaluating prisoner and parolee First Amendment claims in Kerr v. 
Farrey.37 In Kerr, an inmate sued a minimum-security prison in Wisconsin 
that required those convicted of drug-related crimes to attend a 
rehabilitation program or face removal to a higher security prison.38 
Narcotics Anonymous (N.A.) was the program’s sole facilitator and thus 
 
28  See Gallas, supra note 13 at 1078–79. 
29  Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
30  Id.  
31  See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (finding official school prayer 
unconstitutional); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962) (finding 
school Bible reading unconstitutional); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) 
(finding unconstitutional a law that required public officials to affirm belief in the existence 
of God). 
32  Kerr, 95 F.3d at 477–78; see, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (finding 
state law providing aid to private parochial schools unconstitutional); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (finding state law providing aid to private parochial schools 
unconstitutional with respect to reimbursing public transportation costs of private parochial 
school students). 
33  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971). 
34  Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
35  See Honeymar, supra note 22. 
36  See infra, notes 47–48. 
37  See Kerr, 95 F.3d 472. 
38  Id. at 474. 
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the only option for the inmates required to participate.39 One such inmate, 
James Kerr, objected to the consistent references to and invocations of God 
in N.A.’s rehabilitation program and sued when his access to parole was 
adversely affected.40  The district court analyzed Kerr’s First Amendment 
claim, not as a claim that the state was coercing him to participate in a 
religious exercise, but rather as essentially claiming that the state was acting 
in a way that benefits religions. Thus, the district court applied the Lemon 
test and, under that test, it ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of 
the state.41 
The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the district court’s reliance on 
Lemon and reversed its grant of summary judgment, as the Seventh Circuit 
treated Kerr’s first claim as one alleging that the state was coercing him to 
follow religion and not just acting in a way to benefit religion.42 Relying on 
Supreme Court language from Lee v. Weisman,43 the court held that state 
coercion claims beg three questions: “[F]irst, has the state acted; second, 
does the action amount to coercion; and third, is the object of the coercion 
religious or secular?”44 The court answered the first question affirmatively, 
even though N.A. ran the program, because the prison required inmate 
participation.45  In response to the second question, the court found that the 
state had acted coercively by penalizing non-participation with removal to 
higher security prisons even though Kerr himself was not removed.46 
Finally, the court held that the coercion was religious because the program 
was “based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being,” 
despite N.A.’s insistence that their God concept could be interpreted 
secularly.47 
 
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 475. Kerr was removed to a higher security prison for noncompliance with the 
rehabilitation program. Id. 
41  Id. at 476–79. 
42  Id. at 479–80. 
43  505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (The “government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”). 
44  Kerr, 95 F.3d at 479. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 479–80. The N.A. principles repeatedly reference “God, as we understood 
Him.” Id. (quoting the twelve steps of the N.A. program). Although the district court 
interpreted the second clause as compatible with secular concepts such as “willpower within 
the individual,” the Seventh Circuit focused on the phrase’s inclusion of the word “Him.”  
Id. at 480. It emphasized, “[e]ven if we expanded the steps to include polytheistic ideals, or 
animistic philosophies, they are still fundamentally based on a religious concept of a Higher 
Power.” Id. 
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All federal appeals, district,48 and state supreme courts49 addressing 
prisoners’ and parolees’ First Amendment rights have used the standard the 
Seventh Circuit articulated in Kerr to reach the same conclusion on the 
constitutional question.50 However, since all heterodox lawsuits name 
public officials as defendants, the core constitutional issue is, in practice, 
always linked to and contingent upon a determination of whether the 
official has qualified immunity. On this question courts have meaningfully 
evolved since Kerr. 
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides government officials 
found to have violated certain rights with immunity from civil damages 
liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”51 “Clearly established,” the operative phrase, serves as the primary 
locus for debate. If the right the official violated was “clearly established” 
at the time of the violation, then the official is not entitled to qualified 
immunity.52  If, however, the right the official violated was not “clearly 
established” at the time of the violation, then the official is entitled to 
 
48  See, e.g., Turner v. Hickman, 342 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (finding 
unconstitutional violation where atheist parolee was required to attend NA program); 
Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F. Supp. 2d 298 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding compulsory 
participation in an AA-based substance abuse program unconstitutional); Warburton v. 
Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)  (finding compulsory participation 
unconstitutional with respect to a N.A. program); Nusbaum v. Terrangi, 210 F. Supp. 2d 784 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (finding the conditioning of “good credits” on attending religious 
programming unconstitutional); Ross v. Keelings, 2 F. Supp. 2d 810 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(finding unconstitutional a compulsory program emphasizing rehabilitation through 
spirituality); Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (denying summary 
judgment on atheist parolee’s claim that he was unconstitutionally coerced to attend a AA-
based rehabilitation program). 
49  See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996) (finding requirement to 
attend AA meetings to participate in family reunion program unconstitutional); Arnold v. 
Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. 1997) (finding that inmate stated a claim 
where he was denied parole for failure to participate in AA meetings). 
50  See, e.g., Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that a Missouri 
nonbeliever’s First Amendment rights had been violated when he was denied early parole 
after withdrawing from a religious rehabilitation program necessary to receive it); Hazle v. 
Crofood, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a California atheist’s First Amendment rights 
had been violated when he was returned to prison for refusing to participate in religious 
exercises during parole program); Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
that a parole officer had violated a Buddhist parolee’s rights by compelling his participation 
in a religious program despite his objections and request for a secular alternative); Warner v. 
Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997), aff’d on reh’g, 173 F.3d 120 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (finding required AA meetings unconstitutional). 
51  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
52  Id. 
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qualified immunity.53 The Supreme Court has clarified that this question 
must be answered from the perspective of a reasonable public official in the 
defendant’s position.54 
Because precedent was sparse at the time Kerr was decided, the 
Seventh Circuit ultimately found the rights were not “clearly established,” 
and thus, the officials were immune.55 Although the broader coercion 
question was abundantly clear, it had not been answered in a relevant 
context so case law could not be considered “clearly established.”56 By 
2007, however, other courts were becoming less forgiving.57 In Inouye v. 
Kemna, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of qualified 
immunity to a Hawaiian parole officer emphasizing that case law was 
almost entirely consistent and that the limited exceptions in existence were 
either distinguishable or had been abrogated by higher courts.58 All 
appellate cases since Inouye have denied qualified immunity on the First 
Amendment question.59 
II. EXISTING LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING PAROLE 
PROGRAMS & PAROLEE RIGHTS 
This part focuses on existing legal instruments that affect the 
constitutional rights of heterodox parolees. Subpart A discusses protections 
that have been implemented at the state level, most notably by DOCs and 
administrative agencies in California and Illinois. Subpart B examines 
actions taken at the federal level, such as the Charitable Choice regulations 
and executive orders controlling the distribution of money under the Faith-
Based Initiatives Program. This Comment ultimately argues that many of 
the legal instruments discussed in this part provide strong models for 
additional public actions that can resolve the heterodox parolee problem 
more comprehensively. 
A. STATE GOVERNMENTS 
Despite being thoroughly rebuked by courts, states have been wary to 
 
53  Id. 
54  See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603, 617 (1999) (finding that case law may be “clearly established” even without an absolute 
legal consensus). 
55  See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480–81 (7th Cir. 1996). 
56  See id. 
57  See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007). 
58  See id. at 715–16. 
59  See, e.g., Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014); Hazle v. Crofood, 727 F.3d 
983 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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limit their reliance on religious rehabilitation organizations.  So far, 
California is the only state that reacted to First Amendment parolee lawsuits 
by formally adopting written policies to prevent future civil rights abuses.60 
In fact, it did so twice.61 
The first time California reacted to a First Amendment parolee lawsuit 
was in response to the 1994 case, O’Connor v. California.62 The heterodox 
plaintiff in that case had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and 
was required to participate in an outpatient alcoholism treatment program.63 
Although CDOC had approved a secular alcoholism program in his area, it 
was not included on the list of options the corrections officials gave him 
when he reported for referrals.64 This had the effect of limiting him to AA 
or other religious programs.65 After signing up for one, the heterodox 
plaintiff took exception to its religious content and filed suit on First 
Amendment grounds in the U.S. District Court for California’s Central 
District.66 The district court ultimately held the plaintiff’s First Amendment 
rights were not violated because there was a secular alternative to the 
religious program in the area.67 
Even though the district court denied the plaintiff’s claim, the state of 
California took action to protect other heterodox parolees. The state 
amended California Administrative Code § 9860, which is a regulation 
issued by the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs that 
deals with the menu of programming options for parolees sentenced to 
alcohol treatment. The version of the regulation in effect at the time the 
plaintiff in O’Connor filed suit simply stated that corrections officers within 
each county “shall ensure that a variety of options are available which take 
into account the unique needs of each participant.”68 This language did not 
immediately call attention to parolees’ religious beliefs or lack thereof. 
However, as a result of the O’Connor case, California amended the 
regulation to more clearly address parolees’ religious beliefs or lack thereof. 
The amended provision, which came into effect in 1995, addresses this 
issue in two ways. First, it classifies AA and other 12-Step programs as 
 
60  See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying discussion. 
61  See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying discussion. 
62  855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
63  See id. at 304. 
64  See id. at 305. 
65  See id. 
66  See id. at 304–05. 
67  See id. at 307–08. 
68  See Honeymar, supra note 22, at 468 (emphasis added) (quoting the 1992 version of 
the provision). 
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sectarian organizations and then requires counties using such organization 
to also list available “non-sectarian organizations.”69 Second, and more 
importantly, it compels counties to approve a non-sectarian organization if: 
(1) it has only certified sectarian organizations, or (2) the only available 
non-sectarian organizations are not accessible to the parolee.70 The second 
prong of the amended regulation is particularly remarkable in that is goes 
farther than any other piece of law by requiring that the non-sectarian 
parolee programs be “accessible” to the parolee, unlike the previous version 
of the regulation, which only required that alternative options be made 
“available.”  “Accessibility” is a stricter concept than availability, and thus 
effectively provides more protection for heterodox parolees.71 
The second time California took legislative action as a result of a 
heterodox parolee lawsuit ultimately resulted from a gap in the protection 
provided by the amended § 9860. The amended regulation operated in 
relatively small space: it only dealt with outpatient self-help alcohol 
treatment programs.72 As a consequence, the regulation did not eliminate 
the possibility of constitutional rights being infringed upon in other areas of 
the parole system, such as narcotics and inpatient programs. Barry Hazle, 
ordered to attend a drug treatment program, fell into this gap about a decade 
later.  This eventually led to California passing its second initiative to 
address the rights of heterodox parolees. 
In November 2008, more than a year after Hazle filed suit, CDOC 
issued new instructions that barred parole officers from penalizing parolees 
who refuse to participate in religious or faith-based programs because of 
their beliefs.73 With the Ninth Circuit’s 2007 holding in Inouye in mind, 
CDOC spoke unequivocally: “Effective immediately, Parole Agents 
assigned to the [Division of Adult Parole Operations], shall not require a 
parolee attend AA, NA, or any other religious based program if the parolee 
refused to participate in such a program for religious reasons.”74 Most 
importantly, the directive stipulated that if a parolee refused to participate 
on religious grounds, “the parolee shall be referred to an alternative 
nonreligious program.”75 Although the directive failed to protect Hazle, it 
seems to have prevented similar lawsuits since. 
To this extent, the directive seems to have been successful, but it has 
 
69  Id. at 468 & 468 nn.142–44 (quoting the 1995 version of the provision). 
70  See id. at 468 & 468 n.145. 
71  See id. at 466, 471. 
72  See id. at 471–72. 
73  See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., supra note 21. 
74  Id.  
75  Id.  
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potential conflicts with CDOC rules governing parolee program placement. 
Specifically, the CDOC operations manual calls for parolees to be placed in 
rehabilitation programs based in the same county in which they were 
incarcerated.76 There are several exceptions allowing parolees to be placed 
in other counties, but a lack of secular programs is not among them.77 
Although it may be that the official policy under the operations manual is 
practically to provide for an exception in the case of secular programs as 
well,78 the best practice would be to formally incorporate the directive into 
the operations manual. 
This confusion aside, CDOC has the most robust protections for 
heterodox parolees in the country. Its strength is especially clear when 
contrasted with the protections (or lack thereof) in other states. Illinois is 
the only other state with protections on the books in the rehabilitation 
context.79 The Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) is 
responsible for licensing rehabilitative facilities in the state.80 IDHS’s 
licensing requirements stipulate that all types of facilities must provide 
patients with a list of their rights.81 The list must include statements 
conveying that: “access to services will not be denied on the basis of race, 
religion, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation or HIV status,” and “the 
right to refuse treatment or any specific treatment procedure and a right to 
be informed of the consequences resulting from such refusal.”82 Although 
heterodox parolees could argue that a failure to place them in a non-
religious program constitutes a denial to services on the basis of religion, 
the argument is tenuous in light of how challenges under this licensing 
requirement are brought in reality. The vast majority of religious objections 
handled by state and federal courts are made by individuals that adhere to 
specific religious creeds, not individuals that reject such belief systems.83 
Furthermore, state corrections officers, like judges, are generally more 
suspicious of the motives of heterodox individuals who, like adherents of 
obscure religions, have a hard time establishing the sincerity of their 
convictions.84 This probably means that Illinois parolees would have to 
 
76  See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., OPERATIONS MANUAL §§ 81010.1–.2 (2005). 
77  See id. § 81010.2. 
78  The relevant policy statement suggests that “[a]n inmate may be paroled to another 
county if it would be in the best interest of the public and of the parolee.” Id. (emphasis 
added).  
79  Patient Rights, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 2060.323 (2003). 
80  Id. § 2060.323(a) 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  See supra notes 48–51. 
84  See infra notes 162–163 and accompanying discussion of relevant cases. 
4. GRUDZINA 3/2/2017  3:39 PM 
578 GRUDZINA [Vol. 106 
resort to filing a lawsuit to vindicate their constitutional rights, like parolees 
in other states. 
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The federal government’s involvement with parole and rehabilitation 
systems is principally shaped by its Charitable Choice regulations.85 
Charitable Choice was created by the Welfare Reform Act of 1996.86 In 
2000, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services expanded it to 
cover substance abuse treatment providers.87 Charitable Choice makes 
religious organizations eligible for federal funding without having to 
“secularize” as long as they comply with a number of provisions designed 
to ensure they do not violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
of the First Amendment.88 Broadly speaking, religious organizations 
comply with these provisions when they do not “discriminate against a 
program beneficiary or prospective program beneficiary on the basis of 
religion or religious belief.”89 But as the provision has never been 
adjudicated, it is unclear what discrimination means in this context. 
Similarly, Charitable Choice bans organizations from using federal money 
to engage in “sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.”90 As the 
operative term—”sectarian”—is undefined, it is unclear whether this would 
prevent, for example, a non-denominational Christian prayer as well as a 
denominational one.91 
Notwithstanding this lingering confusion, Charitable Choice’s most 
notable feature is unambiguous. Similar to the aforementioned Illinois 
regulations,92 Charitable Choice gives program participants the right to 
object to any treatment.93 But it goes further. First, it makes clear that this 
 
85  See 42 C.F.R. § 54 (2016). 
86  See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (2016). 
87  See 42 C.F.R. § 54.1 (2000).  
88  42 U.S.C. § 290kk–1(b), (c)(1) (2000) (“The purpose of this section is to allow 
religious organizations to be program participants on the same basis as any other nonprofit 
private provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations, and without 
diminishing the religious freedom of program beneficiaries.”). Previously, organizations 
would have to eliminate all traces of religion from their services and charters, and refrain 
from taking religion into account in hiring decisions to be eligible to receive federal funding. 
See Meissner, supra note 22, at 692. 
89  42 U.S.C. § 290kk–1(f)(4) (2000). 
90  Id. § 290kk–2 (emphasis added). 
91  See Meissner, supra note 22, at 692–93. 
92  See supra note 28 and related discussion. 
93  See 42 C.F.R. § 54.8(a) (2003). 
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objection may simply derive from the program’s “religious character.”94 
Second, when the objection is registered, the program administrators must 
refer the participant to the controlling governmental body.95 The controlling 
government body is then obligated to give the participant access to an 
acceptable “alternative provider” whose services are of at least equal 
rehabilitative value.96 
Although this protection seems to substantially resolve the heterodox 
parolee problem, its effectiveness is undermined in two ways. First, 
Charitable Choice regulations only apply to organizations that accept 
federal money on its terms.97 As a vast number of private rehabilitation 
programs do not accept federal money,98 many are simply not obligated to 
respect their patients’ ideological objections or refer the participants to 
government officials for alternative treatment. Second, nothing prevents 
religious programs from working directly with DOCs and drug courts. In 
fact, 12-Step programs often take this approach with the strategic end of 
preserving their “sectarian” approach to rehabilitation.99 Given their low 
overhead costs, state resources and referrals are more than enough for such 
programs to prosper. The existence of Charitable Choice’s protection gap 
has abetted and continues to abet the abuse of heterodox parolees’ 
constitutional rights.100 
In addition to Charitable Choice, another area where the federal 
government has gotten involved in the heterodox parolee problem is in 
regard to Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations.  Although the 
federal protections against religious rehabilitation programs are easily 
avoided, the BOP has a record of quickly rolling back other problematic 
regulations that have been challenged.101 Shortly after entering the White 
House, President George W. Bush issued an executive order designed to 
increase aid to religious charities.102 Among other things, this expanded the 
use and capabilities of religious non-profits working in federal prisons.103 In 
Iowa, for example, an evangelical Christian non-profit called Inner Change 
 
94  42 U.S.C. § 290kk–1(f)(1). 
95  See id.  
96  Id. § 290kk–1(f)(1)(A)–(B). 
97  See 42 C.F.R. § 54.1. 
98  See Gallas, supra note 13. 
99  See Meissner, supra note 22, at 675 n.31 (providing examples of “stealth 
evangelism”). 
100  See id. (arguing that Charitable Choice regulations must be made applicable to all 
treatment centers that accept offenders from any court across the country). 
101  See infra note 107 and accompanying discussion. 
102  See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).  
103  See id. 
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began offering rehabilitation programs that required prisoners to submit 
applications.104 Admittance was contingent on prisoners’ agreement to use 
and study the Bible105 and those that enrolled received perks like free t-
shirts and books, less supervision by prison staff, streaming radio, and 
increased phone access.106 Shortly after its implementation, a secularist 
group sued on behalf of affected Iowa prisoners alleging that the DOC was 
unconstitutionally discriminating against non-Christians by retaining Inner 
Change, which was rewarding participants and attempting to indoctrinate 
those that did not.107 Within weeks of the district court’s ruling that found 
the program in violation of the First Amendment under the Lemon test, the 
BOP eliminated Inner Change programming in Iowa.108 
The BOP’s rapid response to the district court decision, which took 
place while the decision was docketed for appeal,109 was not a signal of 
broader policy change within the BOP. The BOP continued using religious 
non-profits like Inner Change in other facilities without providing 
alternative or equivalent programming for heterodox prisoners and parolees, 
or otherwise implementing rules to protect their rights.110 Given abundant 
scholarly criticism of Bush’s faith-based initiatives111 and unequivocal 
rejection of funded programs in court,112 this inaction suggests an 
insufficient level of respect for taxpayer resources and constitutional rights. 
Fortunately, however, the problem can be rectified without negating the 
financial benefits of using religious non-profits to administer rehabilitation 
 
104  See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 
432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2006). Inner Change was also active in prisons in 
Texas, Minnesota, Kansas, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Missouri. The Iowa DOC had hoped to 
set up their own rehabilitation program “without the overtly religious instruction included in 
Inner Change,” but found that doing so was cost prohibitive and solicited the organization 
for programming administration. Id. at 881. 
105  See Nathaniel Odle, Privilege Through Prayer: Examining Bible-Based Prison 
Rehabilitation Programs Under the Establishment Clause, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 277, 278 
(2007). 
106  See Ams. United, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 901. 
107  Id. at 865. 
108  Morning Edition: Bible-Based Prison Treatment Program Shelved, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO (June 7, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
5456293. 
109  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s constitutional holdings, but reversed 
its order for Inner Change to repay the fees it had accepted. See Ams. United for Separation 
of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007). 
110  See, e.g., Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 475 
(2002). 
111  See id. at 476–78. 
112  See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
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programing. 
III. CONSTRUCTING NEW RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS 
This part discusses ways of protecting the constitutional rights of 
heterodox prisoners and parolees in court-ordered rehabilitation programs. 
It prefers solutions that seek to prevent violations from arising in the first 
place over solutions that merely improve the ability of injured parties to 
vindicate their rights in court. 
Subpart A argues that the most comprehensive way of protecting 
constitutional rights requires the continued use of religious service 
providers as part of each DOC’s “menu” of rehabilitative programming.  
The next two subparts discuss specific solutions to the heterodox parolee 
problem that can be implemented while still using religious rehabilitative 
programs. Subpart B focuses on statutory solutions, and argues that there is 
precedent for congressional action involving the religious rights of 
prisoners and parolees and that existing legislation provides a proven model 
for new law tailored to heterodox individuals. Finally, Subpart C focuses on 
non-statutory solutions as it discusses the role of DOCs and other public 
administrative entities involved in the administration of prison and parole. 
This Comment argues that their close proximity to and direct authority over 
prisoners and parolees gives them the best opportunity to prevent abuse 
proactively. 
A. COSTS AND BENEFITS: RELIGIOUS CONTRACTORS ARE 
SUCCESSFUL AND NECESSARY, AS WELL AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
The success of rehabilitation programs is typically measured by 
examining their effects on recidivism rates: if program participants have a 
lower recidivism rate than the general inmate population, then the program 
is generally considered successful.113 However, although these low 
recidivism rates may indicate the programs are successful, they do not 
indicate that the programs are cost effective. In order for these programs to 
be cost effective, the savings from not having to re-incarcerate or discipline 
inmates must outweigh the overhead costs of administering the program, 
which are often considerable. This subpart examines religious and secular 
rehabilitation programs with these considerations in mind. Taking into 
account the additional factor of program availability, this Comment argues 
that the costs and logistics of phasing out religious contractors altogether 
 
113  See Kimberly L. Patch, The Sentencing Reform Act: Reconsidering Rehabilitation as 
a Critical Consideration in Sentencing, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 165, 
190–91 (2013). 
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create an insurmountable barrier for cash-strapped state DOCs. 
It would be difficult to overstate the deleterious consequences 
recidivism has on the administration of prisons and parole. On average, 
approximately 28% of inmates released from prison in 2005 were rearrested 
for a new crime within six months.114 This figure climbed to 43% within 
one year of release, 67% within three years, before finally peaking at 76% 
within five years.115 Moreover, when the sample of released inmates is 
limited to those originally convicted for drug-related offenses, the 
recidivism rate increases even more dramatically.116 
From the perspective of prosecutors and sentencing judges, recidivism 
is perhaps the most important factor used in determining the costs and 
benefits of different sentencing options.117 In 2010, for example, the 
Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission118 developed a framework, 
Automated Recommended Sentencing, to encourage judges to consider the 
costs of sentencing options in light of their predicted recidivism rates.119 
Based on the nature of a convict’s crime and criminal history, the 
sentencing judge is presented with several sentencing options with their 
respective costs to the state budget.120 Critically, the costs of a given 
sentence are listed alongside the historical recidivism rates associated with 
it.121 For example, a sentence of five years probation with enhanced 
supervision has an expected total cost of $8,960.122 If, on the other hand, the 
judge opts for normal supervision over the same timeframe, the total 
 
114  Prisoner Recidivism Analysis Tool: 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://www.bjs.gov/recidivism_2005_arrest/# (select the “Analysis” tab and then the 
“Cumulative Percentages” button). These statistics are derived from data the Department of 
Justice aggregated from thirty state DOCs. 
115  Id.  
116  Id.; see also MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 at 8 (2014) 
(finding that those originally convicted of drug offenses are the second most likely category 
of criminals to be rearrested within any of the tracked timeframes, after those convicted of 
property offenses). 
117  See Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of 
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 169, 169–70 
(2012). 
118  The Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission is a public research entity that 
works alongside Missouri’s DOC and Board of Probation and Parole. See About Us, MO. 
SENT’G ADVISORY COMMISSION, http://www.mosac.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=45464 (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2016). 
119  See Michael A. Wolff, Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: 
What Does Cost Have to Do with Justice?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 161 (2012). 
120  See id. at 162. 
121  Id.  
122  Id. 
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expected cost is reduced to $6,770.123 In this case, however, the respective 
recidivism rates of the sentencing options—both exactly 29.7%—would 
encourage the judge to opt for the cheaper, yet equally effective option.124 
Missouri’s Automated Recommended Sentencing system was the first of its 
kind and is by no means common.125 The impetus behind it and its generally 
favorable reception amongst legal experts suggest that recidivism statistics 
may start to play a larger role in individual sentencing decisions.126 
Ultimately, however, Missouri’s Automated Recommended 
Sentencing framework is crude and potentially misleading because of its 
failure to factor long-term costs avoided by rehabilitative sentencing 
options. As of now, no state DOC, legislature, or administrative agency has 
sought to scientifically incorporate rehabilitation data into sentencing 
decisions.127 Given the dramatic beneficial effects rehabilitation programs 
have on reducing recidivism rates, this is unfortunate. 
Alcohol and substance abuse programs are administered to parolees 
either on an outpatient or inpatient basis. A large majority of both program 
types use a version of the 12-Step model.128 From states’ perspectives, 
referring parolees to such religious-oriented programs is desirable because 
they are typically cheap, their prices driven down by heavy reliance on 
volunteer labor and member donations.129 Many programs, especially of the 
outpatient variety, are altogether free.130 But when statewide DOC costs are 
analyzed, research clearly indicates that both varieties come with significant 
average costs in raw dollars and cents.131 In California, for example, a 
2000–2001 study of substance treatment centers revealed that the average 
costs of out- and inpatient treatment for one parolee were $1,505 and 
$6,745 respectively.132 This data is in line with an analogous study 
conducted in the state ten years earlier.133 
Rehabilitative programs’ price tags, although significant, are largely 
justified by the two beneficial effects they have on systemic costs. First, 
 
123  Id. 
124  See id. at 162–63.  
125  See Branham, supra note 117, at 169. 
126  See id. at 169–71. 
127  See Wolff, supra note 119, at 163. 
128  STANTON PEELE ET AL., RESISTING 12-STEP COERCION: HOW TO FIGHT FORCED 
PARTICIPATION IN AA, NA, OR 12-STEP TREATMENT, 22 (2000). 
129  See Gallas supra note 22, at 1096–99. 
130  See id. at 6. 
131  Susan L. Ettner et al., Benefit–Cost in the California Treatment Outcome Project: 
Does Substance Abuse Treatment “Pay for Itself”?, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 192 (2006). 
132  See id. at 202.  
133  See id. at 194–95 (discussing and analyzing the previous study). 
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outpatient and inpatient treatment programs tend to pay for themselves in 
absolute dollars by reducing the amount of money individuals and 
institutions have to pay for future medical care associated with substance 
abuse.134 When upfront program costs are compared to the predicted 
medical costs associated with untreated drug addicts and alcoholics, the 
estimated costs-benefits ratios are quite favorable: for every dollar spent on 
rehabilitation programs, the state can expect to save (by not having to 
spend) between six and eleven dollars.135 Second, both outpatient and 
inpatient programs tend to lower recidivism rates relative to the general 
inmate population by a significant margin. In Delaware, for example, 
parolees who completed an inpatient rehabilitation program were 11% less 
likely than the state’s general inmate population to engage in additional 
criminal activity.136 When parolees completing the inpatient program were 
allowed to participate in an additional outpatient treatment program before 
release, they had a 31% lower recidivism rate than the general inmate 
population.137 This data has been borne out by subsequent studies 
examining other prison populations in Delaware138 and other states.139 
Although these statistics speak volumes about the relative success of 
parolee treatments programs generally, they do not tell us much about 
sectarian programs directly. An unambiguous statistical consensus 
regarding another factor in the rehabilitation process, however, amply 
fulfills this role: ideological commitment. When parolees’ beliefs and 
convictions comport with the ethos of the rehabilitation programs they 
attend, the likelihood that they will be incarcerated again declines.140 This 
 
134  See id. 
135  See id. at 201–02.  
136  Steven S. Martin et al., Three-Year Outcomes of Therapeutic Community Treatment 
for Drug-Involved Offenders in Delaware: From Prison to Work Release to Aftercare, 79 
PRISON J. 294, 305–07 (1999). 
137  See id. at 307. 
138  See, e.g., James A. Inciardi et al., Five-Year Outcomes of Therapeutic Community 
Treatment of Drug-Involved Offenders After Release from Prison, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 88, 
97–101 (2004). 
139  See, e.g., Michael L. Prendergast et al., Amity Prison-Based Therapeutic Community: 
5-Year Outcomes, 84 PRISON J. 36, 48–50 (2004) (finding roughly the same difference in 
recidivism probability between the groups within five years of their release); Harry K. 
Wexler et al., Three-Year Reincarceration Outcomes for Amity In-Prison Therapeutic 
Community and Aftercare in California, 79 PRISON J. 321 (1999) (finding that inmates who 
completed a drug rehabilitation were roughly 40% less likely than non-participants and 
program dropouts to be reincarcerated within three years of their release). 
140  See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL SERIES 35: ENHANCING MOTIVATION 
FOR CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT xv (1999) (“[L]ongitudinal research 
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simple, almost intuitive concept has been repeatedly borne out by 
research.141 Specifically, when parolees participating in religious 
rehabilitation programs like AA already value religion upon entering the 
program, the likelihood that they will complete the program and avoid 
future criminal activity increases.142 This should not be taken as evidence 
for the proposition that the religious features of AA and other similar 
programs drive lower recidivism rates. Although, on the one hand, it 
highlights the fact that recidivism declines when the philosophical ethos of 
rehabilitation programs matches the preexisting beliefs and values of their 
patients;143 on the other hand, it suggests that recidivism may increase (or, 
at least, decrease by a smaller rate) when there is discontinuity between 
program ethos and patient beliefs and values.144 
Considering this effect associated with the religious nature of 
rehabilitative programs, there is reason to believe that the average 
effectiveness of parolee rehabilitation would decline if religious programs 
were declared categorically unconstitutional as there is a high 
representation of Christians and other theists in jails and prisons. Without 
any personal or emotional connection to secular programs, religious 
parolees would be less engaged with the rehabilitation process and thus 
more likely to violate their parole or eventually commit another substance-
related offense. This insight, when placed alongside the efficacy of religious 
rehabilitation programs generally, provides a strong public policy 
justification for allowing DOCs to continue to use such programs, in 
addition to the fact that the practice is constitutionally defensible.145 
Nevertheless, the best strategy, according to rehabilitation experts, is 
for each DOC to develop a “menu” of rehabilitation programs “that are 
responsive to client’s needs, preferences, and cultural background.”146 But 
little evidence suggests that there are sufficient secular program providers in 
each state to satisfy the demand for parole rehabilitation. There are only a 
 
suggest[s] that an individual’s level of motivation is a very strong predictor of whether the 
individual’s substance use will change or remain the same.”). 
141  See, e.g., Jane Witbrodt et al., Do 12-Step MATO Over 9 years Predict Abstinence?, 
43 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 30, 34–38 (2012). 
142  See, e.g., James D. Griffith et al., A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of In-Prison 
Therapeutic Community Treatment and Risk Classification, 79 PRISON J. 352, 360–62 
(1999). 
143  See Witbrodt et al., supra note 141, at 36–38. 
144  See id. 
145  See supra Part I. 
146  Keith Humphreys et al., Self-Help Organizations for Alcohol and Drug Problems: 
Toward Evidence-Based Practice and Policy, 26 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 151, 151 
(2004). 
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handful of national secular program providers: SMART Recovery, Rational 
Recovery, Women For Sobriety, and Secular Organizations for Sobriety 
(SOS). Collectively, these organizations provide some degree of coverage 
for each state in the U.S.147 This coverage, however, lacks depth. The total 
number of in-person programs is in the hundreds, not thousands.148 On the 
other hand, there are tens-of-thousands of religious programs, providing 
virtually universal on-demand access to rehabilitation services to prisoners 
and parolees. Moreover, the secular organizations primarily provide 
outpatient group therapy run by volunteers, not the more intensive inpatient 
treatment run by specialists. 
A flat constitutional bar on religious programs would eliminate the use 
of religious contractors for both inpatient and outpatient programs, so even 
if secular groups could sustain the demand for outpatient programs, they 
could not for inpatient programs. DOCs could, of course, attempt to 
subsidize the requisite groups to meet their demands. But this would 
involve expending indeterminable amounts of their already limited 
resources. Moreover, in light of the well-established importance of ensuring 
philosophical continuity between programs and their patients, there is little 
incentive to risk upsetting the rehabilitation infrastructure when the 
constitutional impetus for doing so is so thin. There is little evidence 
suggesting that this same philosophical continuity could not be preserved 
for heterodox parolees by emphasizing shared beliefs and values unrelated 
to religion. But available data make clear that religion is one of the largest 
and most important options on the “menu” of rehabilitation 
programming.149 
B. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS: LESSONS FROM RLUIPA AND RFRA 
Since the prospects are slim for widespread state-by-state action to 
mitigate the threat to heterodox prisoners and parolees, some form of 
federal action is desirable. Congress intervened twice on behalf of the First 
Amendment rights of prisoners and parolees. In 1993, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).150 The RFRA barred state and 
federal governments from imposing a “substantial burden” on one’s 
“sincerely held religious beliefs” unless they pass a strict scrutiny test.151 
This requires the government to demonstrate that the restriction is the “least 
 
147  See Gallas, supra note 22, at 1098. 
148  See id. 
149  See Humphreys et al., supra note 146. 
150  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 
(1994). 
151  Id. 
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restrictive means” of “achieving a compelling government interest.”152 In 
1997, the Supreme Court ruled the RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to 
the states.153  
Although the federal government remained bound by RFRA, the ruling 
left states uncovered until 2000 when Congress passed the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).154 RLUIPA, which was 
passed to rectify the RFRA’s constitutional problems, bars state and federal 
prisons from engaging in the same burdensome behavior and subjects them 
to strict scrutiny when they do so.155 Since the Supreme Court upheld the 
RLUIPA’s constitutionality in 2005,156 it has become the preeminent tool 
for religious minorities to protect their religious traditions within prisons 
and jails, and has been praised by both religious and civil liberties 
advocates.157 This subpart argues that there are compelling justifications for 
congressional action in the area of parolee rights and that RLUIPA provides 
an attractive model for such action. 
As discussed, prisoners and parolees who were penalized for objecting 
to compulsory participation in religious rehabilitation programs have 
brought constitutional claims in roughly a dozen states.158 Despite the near 
uniform success in court of these prisoner and parolee lawsuits, California 
is the only state to have independently altered its correctional policies to 
prevent future First Amendment violations.159 It is true that the problem of 
penalizing these heterodox parolees is not particularly old—the first lawsuit 
was brought in the mid-1990s. But the fact that most of the significant 
cases—and most of the cases generally—occurred ten or more years ago, 
suggests that states had a reasonable opportunity to respond, failed to do so, 
and may continue to be unresponsive. This vacuum of state action provides 
Congress with ample cause to act. Indeed, there is precedent for intervening 
in this arena: its decision to enact RFRA and later RLUIPA was motivated 
by nearly identical concerns.160 
 
152  Id. 
153  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
154  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
155  Id.  
156  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
157  See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA At Four: Evaluating the Success and 
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 506–
11 (2004). 
158  See supra notes 32–33, 48–50. 
159  See supra Part II.A. 
160  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 511 (describing how one of Congress’s primary 
motives for passing RLUIPA was its concern “that most states were unlikely to implement 
their own laws promoting the free exercise rights of prisoners”). 
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Each piece of RLUIPA’s substantial burden test is applicable, indeed 
conducive, to the heterodox parolee context. Although RLUIPA does not 
define “substantial burden,” it incorporated the term’s well-established 
judicial meaning set forth by the Supreme Court.161 According to the Court, 
an individual is substantially burdened when she is forced to “choose 
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on 
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the 
other.”162 More recently, the Court simplified its position and thereby 
broadened the concept, emphasizing that a “tendency to coerce individuals 
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” constitutes a substantial 
burden.163 Shrewdly summarizing the relevant body of case law, attorney 
Derek Gaubatz noted that substantial burdens often manifest in one of two 
forms: they either “(1) put[] pressure on individuals to modify their 
religious behavior or (2) prevent[] them from engaging in religious conduct, 
in a way that is greater than a mere inconvenience.”164 Significantly, 
RLUIPA’s broad definition of “religious exercise” helps distinguish what is 
“significant,” on the one hand, from what is “mere[ly] inconvenien[t],” on 
the other.165 The RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”166 This casts a 
broad net and, to a large extent, eliminates the theological hair-splitting 
judges have a history of engaging in.167 Thus, the concept of “substantial 
burden” provides an attractive model for legislation protecting the 
constitutional rights of heterodox parolees. 
Since the term is defined by abundant and well-established case law, 
the primary task would simply involve recasting it, so as to protect 
individuals who do not profess any religious beliefs. Because most of its 
existing formulations could almost accomplish this task already, this should 
not pose a complex interpretive problem. But to minimize confusion, 
Congress must, at minimum, provide clear instructions that foreclose the 
possibility of absurd interpretations.168 Factual similarities between all 
 
161  See id. at 515.  
162  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
163  Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988). 
164  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 517. 
165  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000). 
166  Id. 
167  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 518–19 (discussing how the RFRA’s lack of an 
analogous definition allowed judges to stymie its intent by requiring that beliefs be central to 
an inmate’s religion to warrant protection). 
168  Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 431–32 (1989). 
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heterodox parolee cases to date169 strongly suggest that a slightly modified 
version of the first prong of Gaubatz’s “substantial burden” definition can 
serve as the foundation for new law. Accordingly, such parolees are 
“substantially burdened” when they are pressured to engage in a religious 
exercise that they would otherwise avoid because of their general absence 
or rejection of religious belief.170 
The remaining elements of RLUIPA’s religious exercise protection 
can be imported into the heterodox parolee context with more ease. First, 
the requirement that religious beliefs be “sincerely held” to merit protection 
is almost always perfunctory.171 It originated to prevent members of 
religions that “are obviously shams” from cynically bringing First 
Amendment claims.172 As of now, no judge has questioned the sincerity of 
heterodox parolees attempting to vindicate their constitutional rights.173 And 
despite the relative absurdity of many specific claims made under RLUIPA, 
they rarely do with respect to religious claimants.174 
Second, strict scrutiny can be implemented, without modification, in 
the heterodox parolee context. Under RLUIPA, once plaintiffs demonstrate 
a substantial burden on their sincerely held religious beliefs, the 
government bears the burden of passing strict scrutiny.175 This consists of 
demonstrating that the burden it has imposed “further[s] a compelling 
 
169  Specifically, all relevant cases involve the parolee being pressured to engage in 
certain religious activities—which modifies their behavior insofar as they previously did not 
engage in religious exercise—not being prevented from engaging activities their lack of 
religious belief demands of them. See supra Part I.   
170  In the past, the Supreme Court has contrasted religion with “a way of life based on 
purely secular considerations” and choices that are merely “philosophical or personal” in 
nature. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972). Although somewhat pejorative, 
either of these terms could serve as the operative phrase to appropriately cover non-believers 
and heterodox thinkers.  
171  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 521.  
172  Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974). 
173  See supra Part I. 
174  See, e.g., Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009) (accepting inmate’s claim that 
his Tulukeesh religion was substantially burdened by prison’s refusal to serve him non-
soybean-based vegan diet); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (accepting 
inmate’s claims that his Ordo Templi Orientis religion was substantially burdened by 
prison’s refusal to serve him a kosher diet); Shabazz v. Johnson, No. 3:12CV282, 2015 WL 
4068590 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2015) (accepting inmate’s claims that his Nation of Islam religion 
was substantially burdened by prison’s refusal to serve him one meal every 24 hours 
consisting only of “fresh, cooked spinach, cauliflower, rhubarb, eggplant, red cabbage, 
broccoli, white cabbage, okra, carrot, navy (pea) beans, asparagus, brussel sprout[s], turnip 
root, browned rice, white corn in its milk stage, [or] whole wheat bread that has been slowly 
baked twice and then allowed to set for 2–3 days before eaten”). 
175  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 4. 
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government interest,” by the “least restrictive means” possible.176 Both of 
these concepts are “terms of art” with clearly delineated parameters.177 
Under RLUIPA, courts have recognized relatively few government interests 
as compelling.178 Security and orderly administration of prison rules are 
most widely accepted, but cost and labor sustainability has been 
successfully proffered on several occasions.179 One could easily envision a 
state DOC claiming that providing parolees access to secular rehabilitation 
programs would be cost prohibitive, especially given the more limited 
availability of secular inpatient facilities. Standing alone, this argument 
might carry substantial weight in certain states that have very low demand 
for secular programming and DOC budgets. But given the operation of the 
“least restrictive means” element, it is unlikely to be successful. If the 
circumstances suggest that the government could protect its proffered 
compelling interest by any other means, then it will fail the test.180 This 
imposes a high evidentiary burden on the government in the context of a 
relatively simple demand for non-religious rehabilitation alternatives. At 
best, a government entity might be able to establish least restrictive means 
where it already provides some secular alternatives with limited programing 
options. In this situation, a parolee ordered to complete outpatient treatment 
might find it logistically onerous to, for example, maintain a job while 
traveling to meeting locations (leading to an accessibility problem).181 But it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a situation where the application 
of strict scrutiny in the heterodox parolees context would enable 
government institutions to sidestep its First Amendment responsibilities 
altogether (and thereby get away with not making any secular programs 
available). 
Finally, RLUIPA requires plaintiffs to “exhaust[] any available 
administrative remedies” before bringing a claim thereunder.182 This 
provision is critical to minimize litigation under the proposed RLUIPA. But 
 
176  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2015). 
177  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 539–40 (discussing key case law). 
178  See id.  
179  See, e.g., Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007); Muhammad v. Sapp, 
388 F. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2010); Williams v. Wilkinson, No. 96-3715, 1997 WL 809971 
(6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1997); Via v. Wilhelm, No. 7:11CV00050, 2011 WL 5419709 (W.D. Va. 
Nov. 9, 2011). 
180  See Gaubatz, supra note 157, at 541. 
181  See Honeymar, supra note 22, at 465–67 (discussing situations where limited 
programming availability amounts to “de facto” compulsion of religious activity). 
182  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a) (2000). 
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requiring that parolees exhaust administrative alternatives would make little 
sense if relevant administrative channels do not already exist. This insight, 
combined with a recognition that state DOCs must be involved with the 
process, underscores the importance of supplementing new legislation with 
new rules and regulations. 
C. NON-STATUTORY SOLUTIONS: AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS AND 
PROTECTIONS 
Implementing a modified version of RLUIPA’s substantial burden and 
strict scrutiny tests to cover heterodox parolees is an attractive solution. 
However, because this course of action depends on private litigation for 
enforcement, it cannot be relied on exclusively to protect rights while also 
lowering costs. This subpart argues that appropriately crafted administrative 
rules and regulations offer the cheapest way of protecting the constitutional 
rights of parolees, and that these provisions can be modeled off of ones that 
are already in effect at the state and federal levels of government. 
If new regulation is to be implemented at the federal level, the most 
appropriate problem for it to address is the issue of availability, not 
accessibility. Both concepts are bound up in the constitutional question of 
whether a given use of a religious program violates the Establishment 
Clause.183 Availability relates primarily to de jure religious compulsion, 
which might include sentencing parolees to specific religious programs or 
to rehabilitation generally where the government has failed to approve any 
secular programs.184 Accessibility, on the other hand, pertains to de facto 
religious compulsion.185 This refers to incidents where there are no secular 
alternatives available in the parolee’s state or county.186 A large portion of 
state DOCs’ responsibilities must be carried out at the county level, with 
local geography, crime, and infrastructure in mind. It would be demanding 
too much of the federal government to encourage it to regulate at this level 
of detail. The federal government can, however, reduce or altogether 
eliminate the largest availability gaps with a two-prong approach. 
First, the federal government should expand the grasp of its Charitable 
Choice regulations so that they are not as easily skirted by religious 
contractors and state DOCs. The primary objective of this task would be to 
expand its formal referral process, which protects dissenters by ensuring 
that alternative programs are available, not to compel more religious 
 
183  See Honeymar, supra note 22, at 469. 
184  See id. 
185  See id.  
186  See id. 
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contractors to secularize their charters and services.187 Second, since there 
are likely to be at least some states that experience budgetary and logistical 
difficulties in carrying out the first step, the federal government should 
facilitate compliance and then incentivize further reform. Facilitating 
compliance should consist of reasonable subsidies to states for the express 
purpose of rounding out their menu of available parole programs for 
minimum compliance with the First Amendment. Incentivizing further 
reform, on the other hand, should offer additional, more flexible funding to 
state DOCs in exchange for specific commitments to improve their parole 
infrastructure and thus the level of accessibility their parolees enjoy locally. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the debate about the constitutionality of using religious 
rehabilitation programs to service parolees has consumed the most time and 
ink, it is, at least in many ways, one of the least interesting pieces of the 
heterodox dilemma. Dozens of heterodox parolees have brought more or 
less the same claims over the past twenty-five years.188 The vast majority 
spent years litigating before finally being informed that their constitutional 
rights had, in fact, been infringed. Although we know that a few, such as 
Barry Hazle, won highly lucrative settlements and seem to have been 
decisively vindicated,189 it is almost certainly the case that most were less 
fortunate. All of these people probably would have preferred to avoid the 
punishment they experienced merely for refusing to participate in religious 
activities. This alone underscores the legal community’s responsibility to 
design and implement new legal instruments that proactively prevent 
constitutional abuses, not ones that merely facilitate the expensive, arduous 
process of reactively vindicating rights in court. Furthermore, when one 
considers the availability of low-risk models to emulate and expand on as 
discussed in this Comment, the impetus to design such reforms should be 
impossible to ignore. 
 
 
187  See supra Part II.B. 
188  See supra notes 31, 37–42 and accompanying discussion.  
189  See Mazza, supra note 8. 
